Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2010

Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure
Samuel P. Jordan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Courts Commons

No. 2010 - 05

LOCAL RULES AND THE LIMITS OF
TRANS-TERRITORIAL PROCEDURE

Samuel P. Jordan

forthcoming 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. ___ (2010)

LOCAL RULES AND THE LIMITS OF
TRANS-TERRITORIAL PROCEDURE
Samuel P. Jordan*

forthcoming 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. ___ (2010)
ABSTRACT
Local rules have been unfairly cast as procedural villains. Their
qualifications for the role are purportedly numerous, but chief among
them is that they violate a fundamental principle embedded in our post1938 procedural regime: that the procedural rules applied in a federal
case should not be sensitive to location. It must of course be conceded
that local rules do produce territorial variations in procedure. But in
practice, the principle of trans-territoriality is aspirational, and is
undermined by an array of factors - ranging from competing
interpretations of written rules to the supplementation of those rules
through exercises of inherent power - that inevitably contribute to
location-based variations in the actual procedural requirements imposed
in federal cases. Properly situated, local rules are not an outlier, but are
merely one form of territorial variation among many. To assess local
rules, therefore, we should not ask whether they produce territorial
variation, but instead whether a procedural regime that permits them
produces a better mix of territorial variation than one that does not.
When viewed this way, local rules emerge as attractive - if not quite
heroic - because they are transparent, they reflect participation by nonjudicial actors, and they promote intra-district equality in the treatment
of cases.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 2010, the Supreme Court stayed the
broadcast of a pending federal trial that will decide the
constitutionality of California‘s Proposition 8.1 In doing so, the
1

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ___ (2010). It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that the pending federal trial will temporarily decide the
constitutionality of Proposition 8. Regardless of the trial outcome, the case will
certainly be appealed and is indeed being structured - by the litigants and the
district judge alike - for eventual Supreme Court review. See Margaret Talbot,
A Risky Proposal, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010 (describing the litigation
strategy and the likelihood for eventual Supreme Court review); William C.
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Court took great pains to avoid discussing the underlying merits of
either the case or the question whether federal trials should be
broadcast.2 Instead, the stay was justified on fairly technical
grounds: that the local rule used to support the broadcast order
was invalid because it had been improperly amended.3 This
marked only the fourth time since the introduction of the federal
rules in 1938 that the Supreme Court has addressed local rules and
local rulemaking authority.4 While much of the majority opinion
focused narrowly on the details surrounding the promulgation of
the particular rule in question,5 the opinion also bemoaned the
―lack of a regular rule with proper standards.‖6
This latter concern is not limited to the amendment
procedures, but is directed at local rules themselves. Thus, the
case may reflect some unease with the status of local rules in the
federal system. If so, the Supreme Court is late to the party.
Hostility toward local rules is as old as the federal rules
themselves. Over the past seventy years, a steady stream of
commentators and committees has recommended that the role of
local rules in the federal procedural structure be reduced or
eliminated. The core complaint behind these recommendations is
Duncan, The Proposition 8 Trial: Understanding the Evidence, THE AMERICAN
SPECTATOR, Mar. 3. 2010 (arguing that the decision to seek - and permit broadcast was ―probably driven by the ultimate goal of the case - a hearing
before the U.S. Supreme Court‖).
2
Id. at *7 (―We do not here express any views on the propriety of broadcasting
court proceedings more generally.‖).
3
Id. Because the issue was decided in the context of an application for a stay,
the Court‘s opinion formally concluded that the amendment ―likely did not‖
comply with federal law. But the remaining language of the opinion is not
similarly restrained. See, e.g., id. at *14 (The District Court here attempted to
revise its rules in haste, contrary to federal statutes and the policy of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.‖); id. at *16-17 (―If courts are to require that
others follow regular procedures, courts must do so as well.‖).
4
The three others are Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974); and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
As Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the reason for the paucity of Supreme Court
cases involving local rules may be due to an appropriate deference to the Circuit
Judicial Councils in monitoring and policing local judicial administration.
Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. __ (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5
Specifically, the primary emphasis is on a rather convoluted timeline of
amendments and proposed amendments, id. at *3-6, and on whether the notice
and comment period associated with those amendments satisfied statutory
requirements, id. at *10-12 (concluding no), see also id. at *1-5 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (concluding yes).
6
Id. at *14.
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that local rules are a source of procedural disuniformity. As Part I
explains, the adoption of a federal system of procedural rules
reflected an embrace of two forms of procedural uniformity: transterritoriality and trans-substantivity.7 Trans-territorial procedure
requires the application of the same procedural rules regardless of
geography; trans-substantive procedure requires the application of
the same procedural rules regardless of substantive law. Local
rules are potentially in tension with the norm of trans-substantivity
if they are used to impose different procedural requirements for
different types of cases.8 But as discussed in Part II, the larger
problem with local rules is that they are almost unavoidably in
tension with the norm of trans-territoriality. Local rules create
variations in procedural requirements precisely on the basis of
geography, and for that reason they have long been viewed as
fundamentally inconsistent with the federal rules regime.
To this point, the defense of local rules has been sporadic
and largely uninspired. One recurrent argument is that some
rulemaking authority is necessary to deal with issues that are
inescapably local.9 At its best, this is a narrow argument that stops
7

A brief note about nomenclature. The use of the label ―trans-substantivity‖ to
describe the idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the
nature of the suit is well-accepted, and may be traced to Robert Cover. Robert
M. Cover, For Wm. James Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules ,
84 YALE L. J. 718 (1975). But no similarly accepted phrase describes the
parallel idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the location
of the suit. Professor Rubenstein has referred to this idea as ―trans-venue
uniformity.‖ See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 n.75 (2002). I choose transterritoriality instead, in part to avoid any unnecessary confusion with the concept
of venue, but primarily because it more closely resembles trans-substantivity in
form.
8
Then again, local rules of this sort would potentially be invalid. FED. R. CIV. P.
83(a) requires local rules to be consistent with federal rules, see infra Part II.A,
and the norm of trans-substantivity derives at least in spirit from Rule 1, which
dictates that the rules apply to ―all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States district courts.‖ See Cover, supra note 7, at 1886.
9
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2047
(1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules] (―[Critics] argue that local rules
permit adjustment to local conditions . . . .‖); Gregory C. Sisk, The
Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the
Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1997) (identifying rules related
to the size of the court (e.g., rules related to the number of copies of motions that
must be filed) and rules related to case management based on court caseload as
matters of genuinely local concern that should be subject to regulation by local
circuit rules); Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension
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well short of defending the current scope of local rulemaking
power. Defenders of local rules have also tended to argue that
critics improperly undervalue the benefits of disuniformity in
general and local rules in particular.
Examples of the
unappreciated benefits cited include the the potential for local rules
to act as ―experiments‖ leading to broader procedural reform, 10 the
lower barriers to local procedural change,11 and assistance with
vital court administration functions.12 The suggested conclusion is
with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 861-62 (1989) (―[I]t is bad to have
nationally uniform rules that sweep so broadly in precluding local variation that
they outlaw sensible adaptations to the kinds of problems that are more common
in the mix of cases on a particular local docket than in the national mix.‖); Carl
Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 533, 569 (2002) (noting that many local rules were passed to
address ―peculiar, problematic local conditions, which the federal rules
frequently ignored‖); Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can
Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts be Remedied By Local Rules?, 67 ST.
JOHN‘S L. REV. 721, 731 (1993) (―By and large, the rules governing these
matters turn on local custom. Because the need for nationwide uniformity is low,
perhaps even non-existent, local rules adequately serve their gap-filling
function.‖).
10
Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017 (discussing the Knox
Committee‘s predictions that local rules would have great experimentation value
because they would likely prove helpful in suggesting future amendments to the
Federal Rules); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 569
(describing the use of local rules as a means of experimenting with ―innovative
procedures for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to
foster economical, prompt dispute disposition‖); Steven Flanders, Local Rules in
Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation or Information?, 14 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 213, 219 (1981) (―Local rules . . . alert rulemakers to the need for
changes in national rules and provide an empirical basis for making changes.‖);
Keeton, supra note 9, at 859 (noting that the very purpose of a national rule may
be to generate and legitimize local experimentation).
11
See A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, 168 F.R.D. 679, 707-08 (1995) (describing recent
changes that have resulted in slower reform of the Federal Rules, including the
increased opportunities for comment, increased length of report-and-wait
periods, and the frenetic process resulting from the allowance of multiple
proposed rule changes pending simultaneously). ―It takes too long to amend a
rule or create a new one, and delay not only perpetuates whatever problem
occasioned the call for amendment but also invites congress and local courts to
step in.‖ Id.
12
Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017-19 (discussing how local rules
can help the court manage routine tasks); Flanders, supra note 10, at 263, 268
(discussing the vital role of local rules in assisting local courts‘ efforts to
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that, if properly understood, these countervailing benefits may in
some instances justify a departure from the ideal of uniform
procedure.13 These arguments are useful because the identified
benefits are real, but they remain susceptible to the response that
the cost of deviating from the norm of trans-territoriality remains
too great.
This article develops a more robust defense of local rules,
one that is rooted in an acknowledgement that deviations from the
norm of trans-territoriality are unavoidable and unrelated to the
choice to permit local rules. Trans-territoriality has achieved a
status as a fundamental procedural value, but Part III demonstrates
that that value is largely aspirational in practice. The actual
procedural requirements imposed on litigants are inevitably
sensitive to the location of the suit - and the identity of the judge and the sources of territorial variation include not just local rules,
but standing orders, procedural interpretation, procedural
discretion, inherent authority and procedural common law.
Moreover, these forms of territorial variation often substitute for
one another, such that the presence of a local rule may displace the
use of some competing form.
Thus, the debate about local rules needs to be resituated
within the larger universe of territorial variation, and Part IV
begins that process. The choice to permit local rules is not a
choice to permit territorial variation, but a choice to permit
territorial variation of a certain form. And the question of whether
to retain local rules, and in what capacity, turns on how local rules
interact with and compare to other forms of territorial variation.
Relative to those other forms, local rules emerge as preferable
along several dimensions. They are transparent in the sense that
they are visible, easily discoverable, and knowable in advance.
They are participatory in the sense that non-judicial actors are
guaranteed a role in their creation. And they are stabilizing in the
manage themselves and their dockets and describing local rules as a ― powerful
tool for rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity‖);
Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75-Jan. A.B.A.J. 62, 6465(1989) (observing that local rules can rid courts of certain routine tasks and
can assist busy trial judges by providing them with more specificity on how to
handle daily problems for which there is not a federal rule on point).
13
A related - but essentially unused - defense of local rules is that the value of
territorial uniformity is itself overvalued. Amanda Frost has recently made this
argument in the context of federal substantive law, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94
VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008), and the argument applies equally well (if not better) to
federal procedural law.
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sense that they make the actual - as opposed to the formal procedural requirements imposed within a judicial district more
consistent.
I.

TRANS-TERRITORIALITY AS A PROCEDURAL VALUE

Trans-territoriality, which involves the application of the
same procedural rules regardless of the geographic location of the
suit, was one of the guiding values in the creation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.14 Now, some seventy years after that
creation, it is now firmly entrenched and rarely questioned. Civil
procedure students learn very early that the primary source to be
studied is the body of procedural rules that apply in every federal
court, but that state procedural rules may – and often do – vary.
The idea that procedure tracks the level of the court rather than its
location is accepted, and indeed seems obvious. But it is worth
remembering that trans-territoriality was an innovation, and a
contested one.15 This Part defines what is meant by trans14

It certainly was not the only guiding value, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Context, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law] (discussing how the rule-makers created equity-based
Federal Rules to permit ―the participation of virtually unlimited numbers of
people in trials‖ and ―escape the confinement of the common law‖); Brooke D.
Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2009) (―access‖ – meaning the
expulsion of procedural barriers from the opportunity to reach the merits of a
case – was an explicit target of the rule-makers).
There is an interesting and important connection between the
procedural value of trans-territoriality and the doctrine associated with Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which instructs federal courts sitting
in diversity to apply federal procedural laws. This, too, was designed in part to
promote federal uniformity - and to discourage variations created by the need to
follow local rules. See, e.g., Lumberman‘s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (―One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of
Civil Procedure] is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting
away from local rules.‖); Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1888. Indeed, the reason
cited by the Supreme Court for granting review in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 463 (1965), was a ―threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure.‖
Thus, the allure of uniform federal procedure has generated hostility over time
toward local variations of any kind, whether the result of federally-created local
rules or an obligation to enforce state-created procedural rules.
15
The account presented here is brief and somewhat stylized. For a more
thorough history of events leading up to the passage of the Rules Enabling Act,
see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA.
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territoriality, and describes why it was - and continues to be perceived as valuable.
A.

From Conformity to Uniformity

The introduction of the federal rules marked a departure
from the prevailing stance of conformity to state procedural rules
and an embrace of a competing stance of uniformity among all
federal districts. The conformity regime was governed by the
Conformity Act of 1872, although cruder forms of conformity had
been in place since 1789.16 Under the Conformity Act, federal
courts were required, subject to caveats discussed shortly, to apply
the ―practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding‖ of
the states where they sat.17 This predictably resulted in a
balkanized set of federal procedural rules that broke down along
state lines, and therefore generated what at first blush looks like the
exact opposite of uniformity.18 But in fact, the conformity regime
was designed to promote rather than destroy uniformity, although
the particular uniformity that was envisioned was intrastate rather
than interdistrict.19 That is, conformity had as its goal the creation
L. REV. 1015 (1982); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note
14.
16
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037. This cruder form required federal courts
to use the ―forms of writs, executions or other process‖ that were the ―same as
now used in . . . [state] courts respectively in pursuance of the [original
Conformity Act of 1789].‖ Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
Unfortunately, that language was interpreted to define the applicable federal
procedure as the state procedure that existed in 1789, with the result that
subsequent modifications to state procedural rules were simply ignored. See
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, (1825). Professor Burbank has
referred to this 1792 version of conformity as ―static,‖ and the 1872 version that
replaced it as ―dynamic.‖ See also Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037-40.
17
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. As with the earlier
forms of the conformity acts, equity and admiralty cases were excluded.
18
Indeed, in some respects the Conformity Act regime was even worse because
it also created balkanization between procedure in federal common law cases,
which were governed by the Conformity Acts, and procedure in federal equity
and admiralty cases, which were governed by the Supreme Court‘s rulemaking
authority.
19
See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) (explaining that the purpose of
the Conformity Act was ―to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in
the federal and state courts of the same locality‖); Z. W. Julius Chen, Note,
Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1464 (2008) (―The primary goal from
the time of the original Conformity Act was to spare the bench and bar from
having to work within two procedural systems.‖); Mary Margaret Penrose and
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of a single set of procedural rules that would apply within a given
state, regardless of whether a given case were filed in federal or
state court.
One problem with the conformity regime was that it did not
serve its vision of uniformity particularly well. In part this was
due to incomplete coverage. The Act applied only in the common
law context, so that federal equity cases were governed by a
different set of procedures – defined by federal common law and
the Supreme Court, by way of their supervisory power – than state
equity cases.20 In part it was due to the less-than-ironclad
requirements even within the scope of coverage. The Act required
only that federal courts approximate state procedures ―as near as
may be‖ and in ―like causes,‖21 and this left sufficient wiggle room
for courts to deviate from true conformity and create variations on
state procedures that confused and frustrated the bar.22 In the end,
despite the goal of creating a uniform set of procedures applicable
within a state, the result under the Conformity Act was the creation
of a jumbled and complex procedural mess.23
Another more significant problem with the conformity
regime was that its premise – its vision of uniformity – came under
attack at the turn of the twentieth century. The complete story is a
long one involving many characters, but a key figure for present
purposes is Thomas W. Shelton, who in 1911 introduced the
resolution that eventually led to the introduction of the rules and
who chaired the initial 1912 ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial
Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1004 (2005) (―The purpose of
the Conformity Act was to provide a uniform procedure for all courts in the
same state.‖).
20
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1039; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A
Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974
(1989) (recognizing the lack of uniformity between federal and state courts
within a single state even under the conformity regime). The Conformity Act
also did not apply to admiralty cases. But this did not have the effect of creating
disuniformity because the admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive.
21
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
22
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 (concluding that the Conformity Act
―afforded numerous opportunities for federal courts to decline conformity to
state law‖).
23
See 19 A.B.A. Report 411, 420 (1896) (suggesting that a federal practitioner,
―even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to the proper procedure than if
he were before a tribunal of a foreign country‖); Burbank, supra note 15, at
1041-42 (―[T]he potential complexity of an action drawing on so many sources
of procedural law made the practitioner‘s job difficult‖).
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Procedure.24
Perhaps more than anyone else, Shelton is
responsible for making national uniformity – as opposed to intrastate uniformity – the prevailing procedural vision. In doing so,
Shelton ran headlong into Senator Thomas J. Walsh, who
staunchly defended the conformity regime until his death in 1933.
The battle between Shelton and Walsh was in large measure a
battle between competing visions of uniformity.
Shelton
prioritized uniformity across the federal system, although he also
assumed that intrastate uniformity would follow because states
would willingly follow the federal example.25 Walsh, on the other
hand, was deeply suspicious of that assumption, and feared that the
real effect of uniform federal rules would be to create
disuniformity between the state and federal courts. Walsh viewed
true national uniformity as a practical impossibility, and would
have selected to maintain intrastate uniformity as the most
practical approach for the majority of practicing lawyers.26
Of course, Shelton‘s vision eventually carried the day,27
helped by the death of Walsh and the ascent of Homer Cummings
as Attorney General.28 Uniformity across all federal districts
became the aspirational standard with the passage of the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, and was formally achieved with the
promulgation of Rule 1, which specified that the rules were to
apply ―in the district courts of the United States.‖29 But while it is
24

See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1049 (―Shelton argued that uniformity of
procedure was essential, along with uniformity of interpretation, to the goal of
uniformity of law‖ and ―saw a federal model, prepared by the Supreme Court, as
the best hope for national uniformity‖).
25
See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A.
J. 1648, 1650 (1981) (Proponents retorted that the uniform federal rules would
be a model adopted by the states.‖); Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore,, A
New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935) (recognizing
―unusual opportunity‖ for ―developing a procedure which may properly be a
model to all the states‖); S. Rep. No. 64-892, pt. 1, at 21 (1917) (stating that
both convenience and merit would lead to state adoption).
26
See Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 Senate Hearings](describing himself as ―for
the one hundred who stay at home against the one who goes abroad‖).
27
Although not until after Shelton himself had left the scene.
28
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1095-96 (discussing Cummings‘s role).
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (1938). In 1948, the Rule was amended slightly to ―in the
United States district courts.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also Monarch Ins. Co. v.
Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1960) (―The broad aim [of the Rules
Enabling Act], especially in fields of practice, was to reverse the philosophy of
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accurate to say that the federal rules reflect the triumph of federal
trans-territoriality over intrastate conformity, that does not go far
enough. More must be said about precisely why trans-territoriality
became so valued.30 Trans-territoriality triumphed because it was
a means to desired ends, and it is to those ends that we now turn.
B.

The Ends of Trans-territoriality

Over time, proponents of trans-territoriality have identified
a variety of benefits associated with geographic procedural
uniformity in the federal system. The primary original benefits
were the facilitation of national legal practice the promotion of
nationalized commerce. Later, benefits sounding in equality and
efficiency were emphasized: uniform procedure can assist in
generating like outcomes in like cases, and can do so with fewer
resources being devoted to litigation and to the rulemaking
process. Each of these benefits is enhanced substantially if
uniformity exists not just across federal districts, but between the
federal and state systems. Proponents of trans-territoriality
identified this complete procedural uniformity as a separate end to
be attained by the adoption of federal rules, and concluded that this
end was not only possible but likely because state rulemakers
would quickly and willingly mimic their federal counterparts.
1. Nationalization
The standardization of procedural rules across federal
districts reflected a desire to promote, or at least to respond to, the
nationalization of both commerce and legal practice. With respect
to commerce, proponents of procedural uniformity emphasized
economic nationalization and the associated decline in the
relevance of state borders as justifications for pursuing a body of
procedure that could be applied without reference to geography.31
conformity to local state procedure and establish . . . an approach of uniformity
within the whole federal judicial trial system.‖).
30
See Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 9, at 2000 (quoting Connor Hall‘s
complaint that uniformity was too often presented ―as if it were some excellence
in itself‖).
31
Of course, this is connected to the idea that what we need is true universal
uniformity because some cases involving commerce could not be brought in
federal court. See infra Part I.B.4. There are also parallels here to arguments
made in the domain of personal jurisdiction and choice of law during roughly
the same period. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37
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Along those lines, Shelton urged uniformity in procedure as a
predicate to the support of commerce because it ―give[s] an
assurance of interstate judicial relations as fixed, necessary and
useful as fixed interstate commercial relations.‖32
The legal practice argument is related. Shelton lamented
that lawyers representing national corporations could not easily
navigate the numerous federal courts in which cases might be
brought because of the barriers created by the conformity regime.33
To facilitate the national practice of law, then, it was necessary to
remove those barriers and permit lawyers to cross state and district
lines freely. As David Shapiro has described it, the rules were
designed to permit ―lawyers who went into any federal court . . . to
know what to expect and not to have to undergo an initiation
period or to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners.‖34 A
final argument blends the economic nationalization and legal
profession concerns: The complexity and unpredictability of the
fragmented procedural system was leading many national
corporations to pursue alternatives such as arbitration rather than
litigation, and national rules would have the desirable effect of
encouraging a return to the courtroom.35
CONN. L. REV. 389, 453-54 (2004) (discussing how the creation of the minimum
contacts test in International Shoe demonstrated the decreasing importance of
state boundaries); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (recognizing that choice of law doctrine was
dramatically altered when ―members of our society, in both their personal and
business activities, increasingly disregard[ed] the existence of state
boundaries‖).
32
See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2003 (quoting Shelton); see also
Thomas W. Shelton, An American Common Law in the Making – The Habit of
Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAW NOTES 50, 52 (1926) (arguing that ‗there is no
more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for differing language in the
several states‘).
33
See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2004-05 (quoting Shelton ―these
are what are called United States courts, but instead I call them New York City
courts‖); Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 nn.111-12 (noting that lawyers face
additional barriers resulting from judges applying ―the common law or the code
practice with their various modifications‖).
34
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 2004-05; see also Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin,
supra note 12, at 64 (arguing that the Federal Rules were designed to allow a
lawyer admitted in one federal jurisdiction to easily practice in any other.
35
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 960 (noting
the ability of non-litigation forums to apply clear, simple rules); Subrin, Federal
Rules, supra note 9, at 2005 (arguing that uniform, simple rules – which
encourage corporate participation in court forums – imply centralized
rulemaking).
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2. Equality and Fairness
A second concern raised in the movement toward transterritoriality relates to equality and fairness. Many proponents of
federal rules worried that state procedural systems were inferior,
and that the conformity regime operated in practice to bind federal
courts to apply undesirable procedures.36 The inferiority of many
state systems was attributed at least in part to the fact that most
state procedural rules derived from a legislative process. The
introduction of a national process driven instead by dedicated
rulemakers was expected to lead to the development of rules that
were not just uniform, but also better.
Even apart from any such qualitative improvements, the
fact that the rules are applied uniformly across the federal system
promotes two different forms of equality. First, trans-territoriality
contributes to an appearance of neutrality in the sense that all cases
- and all litigants - are governed by the same set of rules. These
notions of equality and neutrality are admittedly quite formal, but
even formal equality may enhance legitimacy and increase
acceptance of the rules and the system of adjudication more
generally.
Ultimately, though, trans-territorial procedure is
connected to a more substantive notion of equality, one that
emphasizes the similar treatment of similar cases.37 The
conformity regime meant that parallel cases were often subject to
substantially different procedures, and these procedural variations
could often lead directly to variations in case outcomes. The
application of uniform procedural rules throughout the federal
system promised to reduce such inequities. Thus, the transterritoriality principle is intended not just to make the system
neutral, but to make it fair.
This latter version of equality was implicit in the
nationalization argument, although it was not often made explicitly
36

Burbank, supra note 15, at 1042 n.113. At some level, federal courts could
avoid this result even under the conformity regime by taking advantage of the
wiggle room that existed in the Conformity Act. See supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
37
For discussions of this substantive concept of procedural equality, see
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1893-98; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at
2047; Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of
a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976) (describing the desire to
reach similar outcomes in similar cases as ―intuitively obvious‖).
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during the development of the rules.38 In order for businesses
increasingly engaged in interstate commerce to anticipate legal
responsibilities, national legal uniformity looked ever more
desirable. This line of thinking led to a movement for uniform
substantive laws,39 which naturally grew to include procedures as
well.40 Again, to the extent that states maintained different
procedures, the attraction of federal rulemaking as a salve was
diminished because like cases could still receive differing
procedural treatment based on whether the case was filed in federal
or state court. And again, the response was that federal-state
disuniformity was more tolerable than intra-federal disuniformity,
and also that full uniformity was the expected and inevitable end of
the federal rulemaking movement.41
3. Efficiency
A third claimed benefit of trans-territoriality is enhanced
efficiency in the federal procedural system. To a large extent,
efficiency claims are retreads of the claims already discussed,
albeit with a different emphasis. So, for example, in addition to
arguing that lawyers would benefit from uniform federal rules
because they would be able to practice nationally, Shelton and
others emphasized that uniform rules would save client resources
by permitting them to retain a single firm to respond to federal
38

See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2006 (―This ‗uniform federal
rules‘ theme ended up with four strands: interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate
uniformity, trans-substantive uniformity, and, although this was not stressed,
uniformity of result‖).
39
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 70-440, pt. 2, at 10 (1928) (―The development of the
economic resources of the country has brought with it problems that know no
boundaries, and and a growing consciousness of the commercial necessity for
national uniformity both in law and its administration.‖)
40
To be sure, there was not a complete overlap between the movement for
uniform laws and the federal rulemaking movement. In particular, many did not
see the two as related because they did not view procedure as having a
meaningful impact on substantive outcomes. See Robert G. Bone, Making
Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA L. REV. 319, 329
(2008) (―The 1938 Federal Rule drafters thought that substance had little, if any,
role to play; in their view, most procedural rules could be justified by process
values without referring to substance at all.‖).
41
See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513,
540 n.118 (2006) (quoting Thomas Shelton ―a simple, scientific, correlated
system of rules, such as would be prepared and promulgated by the Supreme
Court of the United States, would prove a model that would, for reasons of
convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states‖).
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liability that was national in scope.42 Another source of waste
targeted by proponents of national uniformity was the time and
effort devoted to sorting out whether the state rule or the federal
rule should apply in a given situation, both at the trial and appellate
levels.43 Trans-territoriality greatly reduced those resources by
making the federal rules presumptively applicable.44 And if states
were to follow the federal lead, then the efficiencies attributable to
trans-territoriality would be much greater still, in part because
lawyers would only have to master a single set of procedural rules
and in part because time and energy would have to be devoted to
only a single rulemaking process.
4. Complete uniformity
All of the previous benefits of trans-territorial procedure in
the federal system were undermined at least to some extent by the
fact that states remained free to create their own procedural
systems. This meant that cases could be subject to competing
procedural requirements, thus creating just the sort of complexity
that Shelton and others sought to avoid. By itself, the imposition
of federal uniformity did nothing to guarantee the ―fixed‖ system
that corporations apparently desired. And the confusion wrought
by the project of federal trans-territoriality was arguably far worse
for practicing lawyers because it affected those who practiced
within the territorial boundaries of a single state.45 Rather than
42

1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 13-14 (statements of Thomas
Shelton).
43
See S. Rep. No. 64-892, at 2-3 (1917) (―That cases should be delayed month
after month, and sometimes year after year, should be reversed and tried and
retried, upon mere matters of practice that in no way touch the essential merits,
is one of the reproaches in the administration of the law which has had a greater
tendency to bring the practices of the courts into disrepute than any other
thing.‖); Lile, Uniform Procedure at Law in the Federal Courts, 76 CENT. L.J.
214, 214 (1913).
44
Again, there is a similarity to Erie here. See supra note 14. In Erie itself, the
Court arguably created inefficiency by requiring parties and judges to litigate the
question of which procedures apply in diversity cases. Hanna v. Plumer
reduced much of that inefficiency by making the federal rules presumptively
applicable when on point.
45
This was Walsh‘s primary argument against trans-territoriality. He argued
that most lawyers still practiced within a single state, and that uniform federal
procedure would disrupt their practice for the proposed benefit of those few who
practiced nationally. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2008.
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creating the complete uniformity that would produce meaningful
benefits for the economy and the bar, the federal rules appeared to
promise an exchange of one form of partial uniformity for another.
Proponents of the federal rules conceded that complete
uniformity should be the goal, but they considered that goal to be
not only attainable but likely under their approach. In their view,
states were likely to follow the lead of the federal rules, and the
eventual result would be not just the creation of federal uniformity
but the restoration of intra-state uniformity as well.46 Early returns
along these lines were promising,47 and some states continue to
replicate the federal rules in the interest of preserving intra-state
uniformity.48 But we have never come close to universal adoption
of the federal rules, and indeed the most recent sustained study
found that the gap between federal and state procedures is
widening.49 Despite the failure in practical terms to achieve it, full
procedural uniformity remains a goal that figured into the selection

46

To borrow Professor Subrin‘s phrase, ―[t]he federal rules were to be an
enlightened magnet.‖ Id. at 2026. See also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1974-75
(describing the rulemakers as ―sufficiently imbued with their mission to hope
that their rules would set a model that the states themselves would want to
follow‖) (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the
Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1128-29 (1934));
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice; Developing a
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170, 1179 (2005). The idea that a federal
standard would be an ―enlightened magnet‖ that states would find irresistible is
reminiscent of the Supreme Court‘s flawed assumption with respect to federal
general common law in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). States in that context
proved themselves willing to resist the allure of the federally created example.
And they have done so here as well, see infra note 50.
47
Subrin, supra note 9, at 2028-29 (noting that four southwestern states were
relatively quick to adopt the Federal Rules verbatim – Arizona (1940), Colorado
(1941), New Mexico (1942), and Utah (1950) – with the goal of fostering
procedure system easily navigated by practitioners); Chen, supra note 19, at
1437 (discussing the development of ―federal replica‖ states – a state that has
adopted the Federal Rules – beginning with Arizona in 1940).
48
John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts; A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367
(1986) (classifying twenty-three states as federal replicas, many of whom
identify intra-state uniformity as its guiding value).
49
John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV.
L.J. 354, 358-59 (2002) (finding that sixty-two percent of United States
population live in jurisdictions ―governed by substantially nonfederal systems of
procedure‖ and that state movements towards replicating the federal procedural
system were ―noticeably slackening‖).
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of the new system of federal rules over the existing conformity
regime.
II. LOCAL RULES AS A PROCEDURAL SCOURGE

If trans-territoriality is one of the heroes of the federal
procedural regime, then local rules have been steadily cast in the
role of villain. This is because local rules are the most visible
source of territorial variation in the federal procedural system,
which makes them the most obvious deviation from the
aspirational norm of trans-territoriality. This Part reviews the
longstanding and ongoing debate over local rules. It first describes
the current approach toward local rules in the federal system, and
explains how that approach has changed over time, particularly
with respect to promulgation and enforcement. It then reviews the
numerous complaints that have been laid at the feet of local rules,
most of which are rooted in a commitment to trans-territorial
procedure and a parallel resistance to territorial variation.
A.

A Primer on Local Rules

The authority for local rules is clear and unassailable:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a), which has been part of the
federal rules since their inception, permits district courts to ―adopt
and amend rules governing its practice.‖50 The scope of the
authority provided is not unlimited, however; local rules must ―be
consistent with – but not duplicate – federal statutes and rules.‖51
While that limitation is not insignificant, it leaves substantial room
for district courts to create a set of localized procedures, and every

50

FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). Local rules must be issued after ―notice and an
opportunity for comment,‖ and must be supported by a majority of the district
judges comprising a district court. Id.
51
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). For a time, it looked as though another limitation,
created not by the rules themselves but by the Supreme Court, might be
imposed: local rules should not introduce ―basic procedural innovations.‖ Miner
v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960) (favoring the formal rulemaking process and
its ―mature consideration of informed opinion‖). But the Court has not appeared
willing to police the limitation, and the experience with civil jury size seriously
undermines its force. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1582-83 (discussing the Supreme Court‘s decision
in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973), which upheld local rules
changing the size of the civil jury).
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district court has done so.52 The resulting 94 sets of local rules are,
like the federal rules, formal and fixed. Unlike the federal rules,
however, local rules are not subject to the rulemaking process
outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74, but are instead promulgated
after notice and comment and upon a majority vote of district
judges.53
Local rules vary considerably in terms of both content and
significance. Many local rules announce technical and relatively
mundane requirements related to issues like filing and motions
practice.54 Rules detailing paper size and method of binding are
staples of local rules,55 designed primarily to facilitate the work of
the clerk‘s office. But not all rules fit that description, and some
impose substantial procedural requirements. For example, many
districts now have local rules that structure the summary judgment
process, including details relating to the form and the nature of the
filings that must be submitted.56
Because local rules vary from district to district, lawyers
who practice in multiple districts must master multiple sets of
formal procedural packages.57 Thus far, the Advisory Committee
has responded to the burdens imposed by inter-district variations in
local rules not by removing or narrowing the authority to issue
52

See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/distr-localrules.html for a list of current
local rules.
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
54
See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 77-121(b) (―The regular office hours of the Clerk at
Sacramento and Fresno shall be from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day except
Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and such other times so ordered by the Chief
Judge.‖). More recently, local rules describing electronic filing requirements
have become common. See, e.g., W.D.N.C. R. 5.2.1(B) (―All documents
submitted for filing in this district shall be filed electronically unless expressly
exempted from electronic filing either by the Administrative Procedures or by
the assigned judge.‖).
55
See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 7-130(b) (―All documents presented for conventional
filing or lodging and the chambers courtesy copies shall be on white, unglazed
opaque paper of good quality with numbered lines in the left margin, 8-1/2‖ x
11‖ in size, and shall be flat, unfolded (except where necessary for presentation
of exhibits), firmly bound at the top left corner, pre-punched with two (2) holes
(approximately 1/4‖ diameter) centered 2-3/4‖ apart, ½‖ to 5/8‖ from the top
edge of the document, and shall comply with all other applicable provisions of
these Rules.‖).
56
See, e.g., N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; for a discussion of cases enforcing N.D. Ill. L.R.
56.1, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
57
See G.J.B. & Associates, Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990)
(―Counsel appearing before the district court are duty-bound to know the
practice of the district court.‖).
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them,58 but instead by instituting measures designed to facilitate
identification and compliance and to decrease sanctions for noncompliance in certain cases.59 In particular, the 1995 amendments
to Rule 83 included two notable new provisions. First, Rule
83(a)(1) was modified to require local rules to ―conform to any
uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference
of the United States.‖60 This addition was intended to avoid
―unnecessary traps for counsel and litigants‖ by ―mak[ing] it easier
for an increasingly national bar and for litigants to locate a local
rule that applies to a particular procedural issue.‖61 Second, the
same set of amendments added a provision – FRCP 83(a)(2) – that
58

In the 1985 amendments, the advisory committee did alter the rule to
―enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of
proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 83
advisory committee notes. But this modification retained the scope of local
rulemaking authority, and was explicitly made ―without impairing the
procedural validity of existing local rules.‖ Id. Several commentators have
suggested that the authority for local rulemaking authority be narrowed. See,
e.g., Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for
Determining the Validity of Federal Districts Courts’ Exercise of Local
Rulemaking Power; Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 497 (1991) (arguing that the federal courts‘
judgment about procedure should be subordinated to congressional judgment in
order to ―ensure that Congress makes the important decisions about procedure‖).
While the Advisory Committee has declined to decrease the authority for
local rulemaking, it has also declined to increase it. Most notably, the
Committee withdrew two proposed amendments to Rule 83 that would have
permitted district courts to introduce local rules that were inconsistent with the
federal rules, at least on an experimental basis. See Committee on Rules of
Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 152 (1991) (―With the
approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a district court may
adopt an experimental local rule inconsistent with [the national rules]‖);
Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, and Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 337, 370
(1983) (―When authorized by the judicial council, a district court may adopt on
an experimental basis for no longer than two years a local rule that may not be
challenged for inconsistency with [the national rules].‖). See also Marcus, supra
note 51, at 1584 n.95.
59
Congress has intervened, too. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988) (permitting
the ―judicial council of the relevant circuit‖ to modify or abrogate local rules).
60
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
61
FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes.
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prevents the court from depriving a party of rights as a result of a
―nonwillful failure to comply‖ with a ―local rule imposing a
requirement of form.‖62 Again, the advisory notes reflect an
awareness that lawyers may be burdened by the complexities of
local rules, and may therefore be unaware or forgetful of formal
requirements contained there.63
Although the addition of Rule 83(a)(2) limits the
availability of sanctions, it simultaneously confirms that some
local rules – namely, those that do not impose ―a requirement of
form‖ – may be enforced to deprive a party of rights. Local rules
in that category essentially operate as functional equivalents to the
federal rules; district courts demand compliance, and may strictly
enforce the rules or impose sanctions when procedural
requirements are not followed. Some districts include specific
provisions highlighting the availability of sanctions for violations
of local rules.64 But even in the absence of such a provision,
sanctions for failure to heed the requirements of local rules have
been upheld when challenged in the appellate courts.65 For
example, in a series of cases, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the
entry of summary judgment in cases where a non-movant fails to
comply with the procedural requirements of N.D. Ill. LR 56.1.66 In
doing so, the court has recognized that the rule ―impose[s] a
62

FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes. (―[A] party should not be
deprived of a right to a jury trial because its attorney, unaware or – of forgetting
– a local rule directing that jury demands be noted in the caption of the case,
includes a jury demand only in the body of the pleading.‖).
64
See, e.g., M.D. Ala. LR 1.2 (―The court may impose a sanction for the
violation of any local rule. Imposition of sanctions will lie within the sound
discretion of the judge whose case is affected.‖).
65
Not all efforts to impose sanctions for violations of local rules have been
upheld. See, e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir.
1989) (―[W]e do not think that the imposition of financial sanctions for mere
negligent violations of the local rules is consistent with the intent of Congress or
with the restraint required of the federal courts in sanction cases.‖). But in cases
where the sanction has been viewed as an abuse of discretion, the basis for that
finding has been that the sanction imposed was not proportional to the violation
at issue, not that local rules are entitled to a lesser degree of enforcement than
the federal rules.
66
See, e.g., Koszola v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104 (7th
Cir. 2004); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th
Cir. 1994) (collecting cases where strict enforcement of local summary
judgment rules has been upheld). Implicit in Koszola and other cases decided
after the 1995 addition of Rule 83(a)(2) is a determination that LR 56.1 does not
merely impose a ―requirement of form.‖
63
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burden on the attorneys for the parties,‖67 but has nevertheless
emphasized that ―strict, consistent, ‗bright-line‘ enforcement is
essential to obtaining compliance … and to ensuring that long-run
aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to district courts.‖68
B.

A Primer on Local Rules Critique

Notwithstanding their pedigree, local rules have faced
consistent criticism since the federal rules were promulgated in
1938. This section undertakes a short review of that criticism,
which has taken many forms ranging from claims that frequent
deviations from trans-territoriality are inconsistent with the
original intent of Rule 83 to claims that such deviations are
undesirable for various functional reasons. Particulars aside, the
core of the criticism about local rules is that they disrupt the transterritoriality that is a central procedural value of the federal system.
An initial complaint is that the fundamental constraint that
local rules be consistent with and not duplicative of existing
federal rules has frequently been ignored.69 From the very
beginning, federal districts introduced local rules that were at least
arguably inconsistent with the federal rules, and as early as 1940 a
federal committee commented on the danger such rules imposed to
the goal of national uniformity.70 Similarly, in the 1980s, the
Judicial Conference sponsored a Local Rules Project, which found
and catalogued a variety of local rules that seemed to contradict the
consistency limitation in Rule 83.71 The existence of local rules
that directly conflict with extant federal rules has the potential to
undermine the supremacy of the federal rulemaking process. 72 Not
only is this theoretically troubling, but it also contributes to a
practical problem: counsel will reasonably be uncertain about
67

Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1999).
Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995).
69
See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2019 (1985 Judiciary Committee
report ―identified several problems concerning local rules, such as their
promulgation without sufficient input, the tremendous numbers [sic] of such
rules, and the frequent conflict between local rules and the Federal Rules‖).
70
See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 969
(1940) (―Knox Committee‖ Report).
71
See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the U.S., Report of the Local Rules Project 1-7 (1988).
72
Sisk, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the destruction of procedural uniformity
among the appellate system due to the promulgation of local rules which conflict
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
68
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whether the federal rule or the local rule will ultimately be
enforced.73
Restricting local rules to those that comply with the
consistency restraint would address these problems, of course, and
indeed many critics have called for more rigorous enforcement of
the clear language of Rule 83.74 But most criticisms of local rules
go much further, and target even those rules that undeniably
comply with that language. These broader critiques are based in
part on a claim that the intended scope of Rule 83 was sufficiently
narrow that local rules would be used only sparingly.75 Proposals
to permit and even encourage broad authority for localized
rulemaking were considered but rejected, and ultimately national
uniformity was embraced as the prevailing model.76 While Rule
83 was still included in the final product, its inclusion did not
signify a desire to promote local rules as a means of filling any
gaps that might have been left open by the federal rules. Rather,
the Rule was intended to provide authority only for the rare
occasions when the federal rulemakers deliberately left gaps to be
filled by local needs.77 Thus, the use of Rule 83 for a broader gapfilling purpose is against the spirit of the federal design, even if the
73

Id.; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2016-17 (noting that local rules
―create inconsistencies in practice among the various districts and leave doubt
and uncertainty in the minds of the bench and bar‖).
74
See David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure:
Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 537, 540-42 (1985) (arguing that a failure to enforce the
consistency requirement of Rule 83 has allowed for the promulgation of local
rules directly in conflict with their federal counterparts); Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Evolving Treatment of the Problem of
Local Rules, 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3152 (2nd ed. 1973).
75
Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules,
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 784 (1995) (―Absent some better reason, it is
insufficient simply to argue in favor of local rules for no other reason than that
locals like to do things a certain way‖); Paul D. Carrington, A New
Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 944 (1996)
(discussing the intent of the rulemakers that Rule 83 be used only on the rare
occasions which functionally demand localization); Tobias, supra note 9, at 538
(―The Committee apparently envisioned that districts would sparingly invoke
Rule 83 to address unusual, troubling local circumstances and expressly
prohibited the adoption of local procedures which conflicted with the federal
rules‖).
76
See notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
77
Carrington, supra note 75, at 944 (recognizing the limit intentional imposed
on the use of Rule 83 to matters ―such as the setting of motion days‖); Tobias,
supra note 9, at 538 (discussing the Advisory Committee‘s intent to have judges
sparingly invoke Rule 83 for promulgation of local procedural rules).
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resulting local rules technically comply with the consistency
restraint.
The preceding argument is not merely a technical one about
intent. Critics also cite a functional reason to interpret and apply
the authority conferred by Rule 83 narrowly: the proliferation of
local rules creates a morass of applicable rules in the federal
system that directly conflicts with the procedural goals served by
trans-territoriality.78 Local rules run counter to the goal of
nationalization because they disadvantage non-local counsel often explicitly so.79 At the extreme, variations in local rules also
threaten the equal treatment of like cases and may contribute to
forum shopping.80 This result is especially troubling because
districts often fail to explain the reasons for their adoption of a
particular rule, which increases the likelihood that participants and
observers of the legal system will perceive variations as random
rather than well-considered.81 Finally, local rules are viewed by
many as a source of inefficiency in federal practice, both because
lawyers must devote resources to mastering multiple sets of local

78

Critics also complain that local rules undermine the procedural value of transsubstantivity. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 9, at 2025-26 (noting that the use of
local rules to fashion different procedures for particular types of cases in
different locations ―reduces intrastate and interdistrict court procedural
uniformity‖).
79
Lauren Robel, Fracture Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1994) (―Local procedures typically favor local
bars.‖); Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 75 (―The premise of the federal
courts is that they reflect one court system doing the nation's business.
Permitting a profusion of local rules for the simple reason that local practioners
[sic] are familiar with them inappropriately disadvantages litigants and their
counsel coming from out of state.‖).
80
Keeton, supra note 9, at 860 (noting that national uniformity serves the
fundamental interest that disputes should be treated alike and resolved on the
merits, rather than being subject to manipulation based on judge shopping or
forum shopping).
81
Carrington, supra note 75, at 945-46 (noting that ―the primary task of each
federal court is essentially the same in all districts, and the differences among
them seldom suggest reasons for material differences in the procedure employed
in different districts‖); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at
577 (discussing the loss of respect for the civil litigation system that occurs
when the public ―believes that the procedures available or the character of
justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice reflects
lawsuits' magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys' or clients' resources affect
the quality of justice, or that complexities or technicalities preclude or restrict
the vindication of rights‖).
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rules and because clients may be forced to retain local counsel for
each federal district involved in a complex case.82
A different strain of criticism focuses on perceived
deficiencies in the way that local rules are promulgated and
reviewed.83 Whereas federal rules are introduced only after a
thorough process that includes a broad group of participants and
several layers of review, the process leading to the introduction of
local rules is relatively more truncated.84 For one thing, fewer
participants are involved. Of course, it is precisely the narrower
geographical scope of the participants that permits local rules to
reflect local rather than national priorities. Even so, the lack of
broader input has led to some concern that local rules are adopted
on the basis of inadequate information.85 In addition, there are
fewer steps in the process leading to the adoption of local rules.
For many years, that process essentially consisted of deliberation
involving only the judges of the relevant local district.86 Although
82

See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that local rule variations
―complicate practice and increase the cost of compliance with procedural rules‖
while simultaneously requiring ―inordinate expenditures of attorney time on
relatively minor matters‖); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9,
at 575 (―The need to search for, understand, and comply with increasingly
arcane local requirements may well have imposed greater expense and delay in
federal civil litigation.‖); Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 12, at 62
(noting that the only safe course of action for a client whose case spills into
multiple federal districts may be to ―retain additional counsel in each federal
district for the case‖).
83
Some of these process concerns have been addressed by modifications to Rule
83. In particular, the 1985 rule amendments responded to criticisms regarding
the lack of non-judicial input ―by requiring appropriate public notice of
proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.‖ See supra note 54;
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ___, * 8-12 (emphasizing the role of notice
and comment in the promulgation of local rules).
84
Keeton, supra note 9 (suggesting that the safeguards of the federal rulemaking process – widespread involvement of national actors and extensive
deliberation by those actors – make it more desirable than the system of
individualized promulgation for local rules); Flanders, supra note 10, at 256-57
(describing the method by which local rules are promulgated as failing to meet
the ―high standard set by the national process‖ and noting that the practice of
consulting with a committee of local practitioners during the drafting of local
rules is ―the exception rather than the rule‖ (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152, at 220 (1973))).
85
Subrin, Federal Rules supra note 9, at 2019-20 (identifying the ―lack of
sufficient input‖ during promulgation of local rules as one of the problems
identified in the 1985 Judiciary Committee report on local rules).
86
See Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 12 (complaining about the lack
of opportunity for notice and comment under the pre-1985 version of Rule 83).
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Rule 83 has been amended to now require an opportunity for
notice and comment, district judges remain the ultimate arbiters of
whether local rules are adopted or abandoned. This has led to a
concern that local rules are often a simple reflection of the
temporary whims of the majority of a district‘s judges,87 and that
concern is exacerbated by the limited and ineffective review of
local rules by the Judicial Conference and the appellate courts.88
A final set of complaints emphasizes the relationship
between local rules and the federal rulemaking process. For
example, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the local rulemaking
device permits federal rulemakers to avoid difficult questions that
should properly be resolved at the national level.89 Conversely,
local actors who perceive a need for a shift in the rules may focus
their efforts at the local level rather than seeking desirable national
reform.90 Lauren Robel has similarly suggested that local rules
undermine the federal rulemaking process because they are too
often rooted in a sense that a national rule is incorrect rather than
simply incomplete.91 Thus, local rules in practice may represent a
form of disobedience, and one that deflects energy away from a
valuable national conversation about the desirability of the federal
rules.
III. THE UNIVERSE OF TERRITORIAL VARIATION

87

Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that many critics of local rules believe
that these rules are usually ―developed with minimal consultation and often
represent the whims and idiosyncrasies of temporary majorities of judges‖);
Keeton, supra note 9 (―[N]ationally uniform rules protect . . . against the
tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges.‖); Subrin,
Federal Rules, supra note 9 at 2042.
88
See Sisk, supra note 9, at 51 (discussing limited review by the Judicial
Conference); Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (describing the inadequacy of the
appellate process for monitoring the validity of local rules).
89
Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 5, at 779 (explaining that local rules can
politically benefit federal decision makers by allowing them to ―duck deciding a
hard question by leaving it to local rules to handle‖, especially in highly
controversial areas where proposed solutions are likely to produce intense
disagreement).
90
Id. (finding that a sense of localism may contribute to the lack of uniformity in
local rules because individuals may feel that local solutions will produce more
satisfaction and are easier to implement).
91
Robel, supra note 79 (―Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is rarely
inspired by the disutility of a Rule under local conditions. Rather, it is inspired
by a belief that the rulemakers got it wrong‖).
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Local rules are the most obvious form of procedural
disuniformity, and also the most frequently criticized. But they are
certainly not the only form. This Part widens the lens to resituate
local rules as one form of territorial variation in the federal system
among many. Some varieties, like standing orders, are quite
similar in nature and function to local rules. Others, like variations
in interpretation or the exercise of judicial discretion, are
structurally different. Whereas local rules create formal variations
in the body of procedural rules, differences in interpretation create
differences in the way that formally uniform rules are applied in
practice. For that reason, it may be argued that these varieties do
not create disuniformity at all, but that argument necessarily rests
on a cramped and unrealistic view of uniformity.92 Finally, other
varieties, like the use of inherent authority and the development of
procedural common law, occur outside the domain of the federal
rules themselves. Again, this might suggest that the formal
uniformity of the rules is not threatened. But even if that is true,
these varieties contribute to territorial variations in the procedural
requirements that are imposed and enforced, whether as the result
of a formal rule or not.

A.

Standing Orders

Unlike local rules, which operate at the level of the district
court, standing orders operate more narrowly, at the level of the
individual district judge. The present authority for standing orders
is the same as that for local rules,93 and the permissible scope of
standing orders is similarly limited by a consistency requirement.
92

See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2047-48 (arguing that uniformity
should encompass uniformity of result, and not simply textual uniformity). For
further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.A.
93
Rule 83(b) permits a judge to ―regulate practice in any manner consistent with
federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district‘s
local rules.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). This language was originally added as a part
of the 1985 amendments to Rule 83, and was moved to subsection b as part of
the 1995 amendments. Prior to 1985, the authority of judges to issue and
enforce standing orders was understood to be part of the court‘s inherent
authority. See infra Part I.C. For a general discussion of standing orders, see
Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An
Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1 (1994).
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But requiring standing orders to be consistent with federal law,
federal rules, and local rules still leaves room for variation, and so
it is unsurprising that standing orders vary significantly in terms of
their level of detail and the nature of their requirements.94
The requirements for creation and promulgation of standing
orders are remarkably informal. Unlike federal rules, which must
pass through the formal rulemaking procedures outlined in 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074, and unlike local rules, which must receive
the support of a majority of the district judges after a notice and
comment period dictated by Rule 83(a),95 standing orders can
simply be issued by an individual district judge. At least in theory,
this informality is counterbalanced by two restrictions on standing
orders that go beyond the consistency requirement already
discussed. First, the advisory notes express a ―hope[] that each
district will adopt procedures, perhaps by local rule, for
94

Many standing orders clarify the judge‘s preference with respect to
scheduling. So, for example, in the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Milton I.
Shadur‘s standing orders set cases for status conferences 49 days after filing of
the complaint, while Judge Robert W. Gettleman sets cases for status 60 days
after filing See Northern District of Illinois Judges, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT:
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
ILLINOIS,
Feb.
22,
2010,
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx (available under the ―Initial
Status Conference‖ link for each judge). Other standing orders impose
requirements that are fairly substantive in nature. For example, Judge Frank D.
Whitney (W.D.N.C.) requires that ―every preliminary motion shall . . . include,
or be accompanied by, a brief statement of the factual and legal grounds on
which the motion is based. A memorandum of law shall always state the
―Bottom Line Up Front‖—that is, the interlocutory paragraph(s) shall: (i)
identify with particularity each issue in dispute; (ii) concisely (i.e., in one or two
sentences) state why the party should prevail on the issue, directing the Court‘s
attention to what the party believes to be the controlling legal authority or
critical fact in contention; and (iii) if applicable, state the remedy or relief
sought.‖ Initial Scheduling Order, Misc. No. 3:07-MC-47 (Doc. No. 2), section
3,
subsection
b,
paragraph
iii,
available
at
http://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Whitney/StandingOrderGoverningCi
vilCaseManagement.pdf. Finally, some standing orders impose requirements
that directly contradict the parallel local rule. For example, Judge Sidney A.
Fitzwater (N.D. Tex.) modifies local civil rule 16.4, which requires a pretrial
order to be submitted at least 10 days before the scheduled date for trial, by
forcing proposed orders to be submitted no later than 14 days prior to the date of
the trial setting. Chief District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT: NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, Feb. 22, 2010,
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/sfitz_req.html (under section I, subsection
F).
95
28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) also requires notice and comment before a local rule may
be issued.
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promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.‖96 More
importantly, the 1995 amendments acknowledge ―that courts rely
on multiple directives to control practice,‖ and that ―the sheer
volume of directives may pose an unreasonable barrier.‖97 As with
the amendments relating to local rules, Rule 83(b) responds to that
barrier not by circumscribing the permissible scope of standing
orders, but by requiring actual notice to litigants before standing
orders may be enforced to impose a ―sanction or other
disadvantage.‖98 Actual notice is often achieved by making
standing orders publicly available on a court website and by
referring parties to those orders.99
Standing orders that meet the consistency and notice
requirements may be enforced, and sanctions for noncompliance
have withstood challenges on appeal.100 In Tucker v. Colorado
Department of Health and Environment, for example, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment after the nonmovant failed to comply with a standing order that required
specific references to the record.101 In essence, the judge‘s
96

FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee‘s note (1985 Amendment). See Carl
Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 359, 364 (1995) (―some circuit judicial councils initiated rigorous
efforts, and others made laudable attempts, to comply with the requirements that
Rule 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed on them‖). But see Bromberg & Korn, supra
note 93, at 9 (―Unfortunately, however, judicial councils have not taken an
active role in reviewing the consistency of either local district court rules or
individual judges‘ standing orders and practices with the Federal Rules.‖).
97
FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee‘s note (1995 Amendment).
98
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (―No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the
local rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case
with actual notice of the requirement.‖).
99
See 1995 Advisory Notes (―Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the
judge‘s practices . . . would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order in a
case specifically adopting by reference a judge‘s standing order and indicating
how copies can be obtained.‖). See also Tucker v. Colorado Dept. of Public
Health and Environment, 104 Fed.Appx. 704, 707-08 (10th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished) (finding ―actual notice‖ satisfied where district judge issued a
case management order that ―notified counsel that they could receive copies of
the summary judgment rules from the clerk‘s office and from the court‘s
website‖).
100
See, e.g., Tucker, 104 Fed.Appx. at 707 (―Pursuant to [Rule 83(b)], a district
judge may establish personal ‗standing orders‘ regulating practice before his
court (and subsequently punish parties for violating those rules), so long as (1)
those procedures are consistent with federal law and the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) the violating party had ‗actual notice‘ of the rule.‖).
101
Id. at 708.
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standing order in Tucker was treated as an equivalent to the local
rules at issue in the Seventh Circuit cases described above, except
that a finding of actual notice was required to justify enforcement.
But some appellate courts have not been willing to put standing
orders on an equal footing with local rules, and have expressed
hesitation about the imposition of sanctions for nonwillful failures
to comply. An example of this more restrained approach is found
in United States v. Brown.102
There, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that violations of local rules may be sanctioned
absent a finding of bad faith, but refused to apply the same
standard to standing orders.103 Although both local rules and
standing orders are explicitly authorized by Rule 83, the court
recognized a distinction in treatment based on the fact that standing
orders are issued without notice and comment.104 Accordingly, the
district court‘s sanctioning authority with respect to standing
orders was deemed to derive from inherent rather than
congressional authority.105
Regardless of the precise standard necessary to sustain
sanctions for noncompliance, standing orders may not simply be
ignored. To the contrary, they represent an additional procedural
layer that creates variations even within a given federal district.
B.
Procedural Interpretation
Local rules and standing orders create differences in the
formal rules that apply to a given case. Properly understood, the
overall procedural package consists not just of federal rules, but
also of local rules and standing orders,106 and each of these latter
components may vary from district to district, or from court to
court. But actual differences in the formal procedural requirements
are not the only source of procedural variation. Disuniformity may
also result from differences in the interpretation and application of
uniform rules. Put differently, federal rules are like statutes,
regulations, and constitutional provisions; they are often
102

Fed.Appx. 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
Id.
104
Id.
105
The Ninth Circuit had previously found that the sanctioning authority
associated with violations of local rules derives from both inherent and
congressional authority. See Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479
(9th Cir. 1989).
106
And arguably also orders issued pursuant to the court‘s inherent authority,
see infra Part III.D.
103
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ambiguous, and courts must resolve that ambiguity through
interpretation.
Part of the Supreme Court‘s self-definition of its role in the
federal system is to resolve interpretive ambiguities,107 and the
extent of disuniformity attributable to ambiguity is thus tempered
by Supreme Court intervention and clarification. But the Court has
certainly not resolved every ambiguity in the federal rules, and
variations in interpretations persist. For example, the workproduct protection in Rule 26(b)(3) shields from discovery many
documents prepared ―in anticipation of litigation.‖108 Although
this protection is not new, and can be directly traced to Supreme
Court action,109 the Court has never resolved the meaning of the
―in anticipation of litigation‖ requirement. Left to their own
devices, the circuits have developed competing tests, one requiring
that a document be ―prepared or obtained because of the prospect
of litigation,‖110 and the other requiring that a document be
prepared ―primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation.‖111
Moreover, even where the Court has attempted to impose a
uniform interpretation, disuniformity often remains because the
Court‘s rulings are themselves subject to variable interpretation.
The evolving meaning of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a
complaint include ―a short and plain statement of the claim,‖
107

See Frost, supra note 13.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
109
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
110
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
111
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1981). For an extended
discussion of these competing tests, see Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or
Misguided?: The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the
Work Product Doctrine, 29 REV. LITIG. 121 (2009) (complaining that the
―because of‖ standard results in ―an abbreviated scope‖ of work-product
protection in the Fifth Circuit). There are numerous other examples of
competing rule interpretations that have gone unresolved by the Supreme Court.
For a sampling, see Kirin K. Gill, Comment, Depose and Expose: The Scope of
Authorized Deposition Changes Under Rule 30(e), 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357
(2007) (discussing competing approaches to the meaning of ―changes in form or
substance‖ under Rule 30(e)); Natashi Dasani, Note, Class Actions and the
Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(B)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 197 (2006) (describing a circuit split in the
interpretation of the Advisory Committee‘s note regarding the availability of
monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)); Daniel R.
Fine, Comment, Defining the Appellate Universe: Does FRCP 52(b) Iimpose a
Duty on Litigants?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1633 (2008) (comparing approaches to
whether a Rule 52(b) motion is required to preserve appeal of inadequate
findings by a district judge).
108
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presents a recent illustration along these lines. The classic
interpretation of that language in Conley v. Gibson emphasized that
the pleading requirements under the rules are rooted in notice and
perform only a very weak screening for legal sufficiency. 112 In
response to perceptions of frivolous lawsuits and caseload
pressures, some appellate courts began to read the language of
Rule 8(a)(2) to raise the pleading bar and require facts beyond
those that would provide notice.113 In two cases a decade apart, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the plain language of the rules
permit heightened pleading only for claims of fraud or mistake,
and reaffirmed the Conley standard for all remaining claims.114
That the Court felt the need to take and decide a second case on the
same basic issue suggests that its initial effort failed to settle the
interpretive instability that prompted the intervention. In 2007, the
Court disrupted whatever stability it had secured in its prior efforts
by revisiting the pleading question yet again, this time to undo
much of what Conley had settled fifty years earlier and insert in its
place a ―plausibility‖ standard that is far from self-defining.115
112

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasizing that a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted on legal insufficiency
grounds only when ―it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief‖).
113
See, e.g., Arnold v. Board of Educ. Of Escambia County Ala., 880 F.2d 305,
309-10 (11th Cir. 1989) (―{I]n an effort to eliminate nonmeritorious claims on
the pleadings and to protect public officials from protracted litigation involving
specious claims we, and other courts, have tightened the application of Rule 8 to
§ 1983 cases.‖). Either that, or they interpreted Rule 9(b) to permit a court to
impose ―heightened pleading‖ beyond the two claims specifically mentioned.
The history of resistance to the ―notice pleading‖ standard created by Rule
8(a)(2) actually goes back much further. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the
Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the
Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13
F.R.D. 253 (1952); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108,
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (imposing a heightened pleading standard for antitrust
claims). The Supreme Court‘s decision in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957), quieted that resistance to some extent, but not entirely. See Valley v.
Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (imposing heightened pleading for civil rights
claims); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) (describing the widespread practice by federal
courts of imposing heightened pleading standards ―in direct contravention of
notice pleading doctrine‖).
114
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002).
115
See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008);
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 61 (2007).
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Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to the plausibility regime, confirmed the application
of that regime to all federal civil cases,116 and characterized the
determination of what constitutes plausibility as ―a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.‖117 The first two of these arguably
improve the clarity of pleading standards; the third all but assures
that interpretive differences will linger in the lower courts
indefinitely.118
C.
Procedural Discretion
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), which the Court decided just weeks
after Twombly, further exacerbated the uncertainty because it seemed to reaffirm
the pre-Twombly notice pleading standard. Add cites here.
Of course, it is questionable how much disruption Twombly actually created
because it is unclear whether interpretive stability ever existed with respect to
Rule 8(a)(2). See Posner article (suggesting that courts never really believed the
Conley language).
116
Except those covered by alternative pleading regimes, such as Rule 9(b) or
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See generally Christopher M.
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (comparing
judicially imposed pleading standards with the heightened statutory pleading
requirements in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Y2K Act);
Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading
Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1999) (reviewing statutory pleading standards).
117
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.__, _, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
118
See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable:
Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 505, 520-26 (2009) (describing how
difference circuits have interpreted the Iqbal standard); Scott Dodson, New
Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mich. L. Rev. __, _ n.41 (comparing critics‘
varying definitions of what constitutes a ―conclusory‖ allegation to satisfy the
―New Pleading‖ standard). See also Edward A Hartnett, Taming Twombly,
Even After Iqbal, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 498-503 (2010) (noting that baseline
assumptions and judge‘s experiences must inherently factor into determinations
of plausibility); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15
(2010) (arguing that the pleading standard after Iqbal makes the motion to
dismiss equivalent in standard (and possibly in effect) to a motion for summary
judgment).
In part because of the disuniformity and lack of stability generated by
judicial interpretations of federal rules, Catherine Struve has criticized judicial
assertions of broad interpretive authority in the context of the federal rules. See
generally Catherine Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2002)
(criticizing broad interpretive authority in the context of federal rules).
According to Professor Struve, the rulemaking process implies that courts
should approach interpretation narrowly.
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A third source of procedural disuniformity is discretion
provided by the rules themselves.119 Many procedural rules
establish fixed requirements that do not permit of discretion; rules
establishing time limitations are examples.120 But many other rules
operate much differently, and instead direct the court to exercise
case-specific discretion.121 To the extent that different judges
exercise the discretion afforded them under the rules differently,
the result stemming from rule-based discretion will be
disuniformity in the procedures actually applied in a given case.122
In other words, uniform rules do not necessarily guarantee uniform
procedures, even in the absence of interpretive ambiguity.
Without question, the most discussed area of procedural
discretion in recent years has been the case management authority
provided by Rule 16.123 The received wisdom regarding Rule 16
suggests that the 1983 amendments created space for judges to
become much more aggressive during pretrial case management.124
119

Interpretation might also be viewed as a form of discretion provided by the
rules. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1970 (2007) (referring to ―interpretive
discretion,‖ and arguing that some rules may be ―purposefully written in vague
language precisely so trial judges could adapt them to the circumstances of
specific cases‖). But for purposes of clarity, I treat the two distinctly, and refer
here only to explicit delegations of discretionary authority contained within the
rules.
120
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (specifying 10 days after a jury verdict as the time limit
for renewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
6(a) (explaining how to measure a 10 day limitation); Rule 6(b)(2) (removing
judicial authority to extend the 10 day limit under Rule 50(b)). But many rules
establishing time limits may themselves be subject to judicial discretion. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (generally permitting the court to extend time ―for good
cause‖).
121
Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law, supra note 14, at 923 n.76
(identifying 36 distinct federal rules that explicitly delegate case-specific
discretion). Indeed, rules fitting this description may be rules by name only.
122
See generally id. at 982-85 (arguing for stricter rules to reduce discretion and
promote procedural consistency).
123
See generally, Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]; Shapiro, supra note 20.
124
See Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 823 (1988) (―Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make
specific what had probably been intended from the beginning – that the trial
judge was indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire
pretrial process.‖); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role
of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 407 n. 130 (1987) (―The focus
on pretrial management is reflected in the total revision of rule 16 in 1983
providing specific authority for early judicial control of case scheduling‖). The
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What that account misses is that judges were already exercising
significant discretion under the pre-amendment version of the rule,
so much so that the ―metamorphosis was virtually a fait
accompli.‖125 What led to the rise of managerial judging was not a
formal change in Rule 16, but a change in the willingness of courts
to exercise the authority they already possessed.126 This is not to
say that the 1983 amendments were meaningless,127 but they
certainly did not introduce the concept of judicial discretion to the
area of case management.
The discretion provided in the current version of Rule 16 is
also entirely consistent with the original design of the federal
rules,128 which contemplated case-based discretion exercised by
judges from their very inception.129 Roscoe Pound, whose 1906
speech at the American Bar Association is often credited with
triggering the American procedural revolution,130 was a ―lifelong
amendments to Rule 16 did more than just ―create space,‖ of course; they also
required early judicial involvement in all cases (subject to categorical exclusions
created by district courts). By adding a requirement of judicial involvement, the
amendments to Rule 16 signaled that judges not only had authority to manage
cases, but were expected to use it. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1588
(―Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case management activity
by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity than was
required‖) (emphasis added); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary
Judgment: A Proposal for Procedure Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1647 (1995).
125
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1992.
126
A variety of factors contributed to this, from increasing caseload pressures to
changes in how and when cases were assigned to judges. For full accounts of
the managerial judging story, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging
and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Robert F.
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Resnik,
Managerial Judges, supra note 123.
127
For a discussion of the actual changes wrought by the 1983 amendments, see
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1984-87.
128
See Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The
Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD
CLARK 115, 116 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Subrin, Charles E.
Clark] (―[R]ecent procedural reforms that grant judges additional power to
shape and control litigation are consonant with Clark‘s outlook.‖).
129
Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and
Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49
ALA. L. REV. 133, 201 (1997) (noting that the original federal rules were
―founded on judicial discretion‖).
130
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
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proponent of judicial discretion.‖131 Charles Clark, who served as
the chief drafter of the rules thirty years later, felt similarly.132
Reflecting those influences, the 1938 set of federal rules had an
equitable orientation,133 and authorized the exercise of judicial
discretion at several points. For example, from the beginning,
Rule 15 has instructed judges to permit amendments to pleadings
―when justice so requires‖134 and Rule 42 has permitted – but not
required – judges to consolidate or sever issues for trial.135
Understood in this context, the story of Rule 16 – and of other
areas of increased discretion in federal procedural practice136 – is
one of adjustment rather than one of invention.

131

Marcus, supra note 51, at 1576; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law, supra note 14, at 944-48 (recounting Pound‘s efforts to promote
judicial discretion).
132
See Subrin, Charles E. Clark, supra note 128 (―At the heart of Clark‘s
procedural outlook was his support of non-defining (what we now call ―opentextured‖) procedural rules; a corollary was his belief that judges should be
gratned broad discretion to interpret those rules. Clark distrusted lawyers and
trusted judges.‖).
133
See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 922
(―The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the
Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common
law.‖); Marcus, supra note 51, at 1563 (―[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
draw their essence more from the relaxed and discretionary background of
equity than the confining orientation of the common law.‖).
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
135
FED. R. CIV. P. 42. Another example of the longstanding commitment to
judicial discretion in connection with the federal rules is Rule 1. See Patrick
Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1325 (1995).
136
In other contexts, the exercise of judicial discretion is arguably cabined by
the existence of specific factors that must be considered. Examples along these
lines include Rules 19(b) and 23(b)(3). See Bone, supra note 119, at 1969. But
in practice, factors impose a small to non-existent restraint on the exercise of
discretion because they tend to be ―very general and frequently just repeat what
any sensible judge would consider anyway.‖ Id.
Another important chapter in the recent story of procedural discretion is
Rule 11. The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was designed to strengthen the rule,
and that was accomplished in part by removing judicial discretion. Marcus,
supra note 51, at 1595 n.137 (noting that ―[r]ule 11 expressly mandates the
imposition of sanctions once a violation is found‖). But the experiment with a
―no discretion rule‖ led to persistent criticism, see Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989), and lasted only ten years. In 1993, the rule was
amended once more to restore judicial discretion to impose sanctions. See
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993)
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Of course, adjustments can be meaningful, too, and many
academic commentators have complained that the recent trend has
been to increase discretion to undesirable levels.137 To the extent
that procedural discretion has indeed been expanding, it may be
attributable to the increased involvement of judges in the
rulemaking process.138 But a precise account of that trend is not
essential here. What is clear is that judicial discretion now has a
major role to play in procedure,139 and it was ever thus.140
D.

Inherent Authority

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the revisions would ―render the Rule
toothless‖).
But procedural discretion stories do not always end with increased
discretion, and the experience with local opt-outs under Rule 26(a)‘s automatic
disclosure provisions may provide a counter-example. When introduced in
1993, Rule 26(a) permitted local courts to choose not to require automatic
disclosures, but in 2000, the rule was amended to remove the discretion to opt
out, and was done so in order ―to establish a nationally uniform practice.‖ FED.
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee‘s note (2000 Amendment). See also Richard
Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 915 (2002)
(describing opposition to the 2000 amendments from federal judges).
137
See, e.g., Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and
the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); Todd D.
Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995); Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631;
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991); Bone, supra note 119,
at 1969.
138
See Bone, supra note 119, at 1974 (―[J]udges have come to dominate
membership on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in recent years and judges
tend to favor broad discretion.‖); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial
Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627
(1994) (using public choice analysis that assumes that judges will seek to
enhance their latitude as a way of serving their self-interest); but see Janet
Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Macey, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (resisting the self-interest assumption).
139
See Stephen Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 229, 240 (1998) (―At virtually every state of the process… the Rules
grant judges enormous discretion in the conduct and resolution of disputes.‖).
140
Marcus, supra note 51, at 1615 (―Taken in big picture terms, then, the
Federal Rules construct has survived, and the current gravitation toward
increased discretion does not threaten to dislodge it in a serious way.‖); Shapiro,
supra note 20 at 1994 (―The history of Rule 16 … suggests both the inevitability
and the desirability of significant discretion in areas such as pretrial
management.‖).
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Beyond rules and standing orders, judges may also govern
the behavior of litigants and parties during the course of litigation
through the exercise of inherent authority. Inherent authority
describes ―incidental actions that federal judges take without a
specific statutory grant as needed to exercise their primary ‗judicial
power‘ of deciding cases.‖141 As that description suggests, the
source of inherent authority is different from the more formal
procedural mechanisms discussed thus far, both of which can be
traced to statute.142 Despite the fact that neither statute nor rule
directly authorizes it, the exercise of inherent power nevertheless
has a long judicial pedigree, justified ―by general references to
Article III, traditional equitable or common law practices,
efficiency, prudence, or separation of powers.‖143
Although inherent authority operates outside of the formal
rules, it is not boundless, and its legitimate exercise is generally
limited to certain recognized areas. In the civil context, the most
relevant domain for inherent authority is the management of
litigation and control of case dispositions.144 But within that
domain, the scope of a court‘s inherent authority is quite broad;
judicial recognition of authority to control litigation predates the

141

Robert Pushaw, Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735,
738 n. 4 (2001); see also Daniel Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the
Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995) (defining the
term as ―the authority of a trial court . . . to control and direct the conduct of
civil litigation without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or
written rule of court‖).
142
Local rules are authorized directly by 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), and are further
authorized by FED. R. CIV. P. 83. Standing orders lack direct statutory authority,
but are authorized by Rule 83 and therefore may claim indirect statutory
authority through 28 U.S.C. § 2072. As discussed above, the power to impose
sanctions for violations of local rules and standing orders has been viewed by
some courts to stem from inherent authority rather than from the rules
themselves. See, supra text accompanying note 32. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown,
Fed.Appx. 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (defining inherent authority as
the source of power to sanction noncompliance with standing orders).
143
See Pushaw, supra note 141, at 739; see also id. at 760-82 (extensively
reviewing and criticizing these justifications).
144
This includes the related ability to impose sanctions for failure to comply
with orders designed to facilitate case management. See Pushaw, supra note
141, at 764-79. An unrelated area where inherent authority has been regularly
invoked – ―supervising the administration of criminal justice‖ – is not relevant
for present purposes. Id. at 738, 779-82.
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introduction of the federal rules,145 and the rules have therefore
been interpreted as being written against the backdrop of inherent
power.146 As a result, courts have approved the use of inherent
authority even in circumstances that appear to be inconsistent with
the more formal requirements of the federal rules. For example,
the Supreme Court cited inherent authority to approve a sua sponte
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, even though Rule 41 by
its clear terms refers only to dismissals upon motion by the
defendant.147 More recently, an en banc Seventh Circuit considered
whether a district judge can require a represented party to attend a
settlement conference.148 Rule 16(a) authorizes a judge to order
―the attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear,‖149 and the
traditional negative implication from that specification would
suggest that represented may not be compelled to attend. Even so,
the court approved the judge‘s order, citing inherent authority to
fill in the ―gap‖ left by the rule.150
In sum, courts can issue orders and impose sanctions under
the guise of inherent authority, and the exercise is relatively
unchecked.
From time to time, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that ―inherent powers are shielded from direct
145

See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (recognizing ―the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants‖).
146
See Heileman v. Joseph Oat Brewing Co., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (―[T]he inherent power of a district judge - derived from the very
nature and existence of his judicial office - is the broad field over which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. Inherent authority remains the
means by which district judges deal with circumstances not proscribed or
specifically addressed by rule or statute. . . .‖); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630-32 (1962) (―The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of
prosecution has generally been considered an ‗inherent power,‘ governed not by
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.‖);
Lumberman‘s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (―One
of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is to bring
about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is
especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings,
an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power,
completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.‖).
147
Link, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
148
Heileman, 871 F.2d 648 (1989).
149
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
150
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652-53. For a discussion - and criticism - of how
courts strategically create gaps in procedural rules to justify the use of inherent
power, see Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime,
__ DENV. U. L. R. ___ (forthcoming 2010).
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democratic controls‖ and has urged ―restraint and discretion.‖151
But in practice, efforts to challenge the exercise of inherent powers
are tricky, both because parties may rightfully worry about
provoking sanctions or judicial ill will,152 and because challenges
are reviewed on appeal under the very forgiving ―abuse of
discretion‖ standard.153 Thus, at the extreme, inherent authority
permits the district judge to act as ―a local chancellor,‖154 and the
written rules – whether federal, local, or standing orders – do not
adequately define the body of procedures applicable in a given
case. Orders entered under the guise of the court‘s inherent
authority are part of the overall procedural package, and variations
in practice with respect to that authority will contribute to
procedural disuniformity across cases.
E.

Procedural Common Law

A final form of procedural disuniformity stems from areas
not reached by the rules, but governed instead by procedural
common law. Examples here include preclusion, abstention, and
forum non conveniens. These relatively broad swaths of the
procedural landscape have never been subject to formal
rulemaking, but instead are governed by judicially-created
doctrines. That initial feature is shared with inherent authority of
the sort described just above; both exist completely outside of the
rules themselves.155 Indeed, Amy Coney Barrett has suggested that
151

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). In the domain of
sanctions, courts have been somewhat more aggressive about monitoring the
exercise of inherent authority, and have generally required that a district judge
make a finding of bad faith before imposing sanctions on that basis. See, e.g.,
Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); Mendez v.
County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); Schlaifer
Nance & Co., Inc. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott
v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d
422, 433 (6th Cir. 2007); Hoffman v. Construction Protective Services, Inc., 541
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008).
152
Resnik, supra note 123, at 374, 402, 413, 425, 430 (1982).
153
See Pushaw, supra note 141, at 764; Meador, supra note 130, at 1805, 1816.
Challenges may also be difficult for the additional reason that many exercises of
inherent authority may occur off the record, and may therefore be essentially
unreviewable. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 123, at 411-13, 42431.
154
Carrington, supra note 75, at 943.
155
Inherent power and procedural common law are also similar in the sense that
they may be constrained - at least up to a point - by the introduction of formal
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the similarities between the two are much greater, and that inherent
power may be viewed as a partial source of the judicial authority to
develop procedural common.156 But even if there is some overlap
in authority, it is useful to distinguish procedural common law
from the exercises of inherent power discussed above. The
primary functional distinction between the two involves the latter
feature of procedural common law: it is subject to normal doctrinal
development, and courts understand their role as creating a
prospective and generally applicable set of common law rules.157
Inherent power, by contrast, is often used to justify the imposition
of case-specific procedural requirements.158
IV. RETHINKING TRANS-TERRITORIALITY –
AND REFRAMING LOCAL RULES

Widening the lens on territorial variation ultimately leads to
a richer understanding of trans-territoriality as a procedural value,
and of the function of local rules within our procedural system.
Trans-territoriality may be an aspirational goal, but it is not one
that is realistically attainable. There will always be variations in
procedural requirements that are sensitive to location. Moreover,
the forms of territorial variation are numerous and overlapping,
such that the use of one can often substitute for another. All of this
suggests that the question debate about local rules should be
reframed. It is not a question simply of whether to permit
territorial variation in any absolute sense, but whether to permit a
certain form of territorial variation. The answer to that question
turns on whether local rules have features that are desirable relative
to other forms of territorial variation they may displace.
A.

Inevitability and Exchangeability

rules or statutes. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L.
REV. 813, 842-46 (2008).
156
Id. at 842-46. But she does not conclude that inherent power is the only
source of that authority; rather, ―federal courts can exercise a common law
authority over procedure analogous to their common law authority over
substance.‖ Id. at 883.
157
Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG.
79 (2006); Bone, supra note 119, at 1967 n. 17.
158
Put differently, the procedural requirements discussed in Part III.D are
examples of inherent power being used ―in the weak sense.‖ Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004).
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Trans-territoriality is achievable if it requires nothing more
than formal uniformity in the language of the written rules that are
applied throughout the federal system. Viewed this way, local
rules are problematic because they contribute to formal and
explicit differences in written rules. Of the competing forms of
territorial variation discussed in Part III, however, only standing
orders raise similar concerns.159 Interpretations and exercises of
discretion occur within the rules, but do not affect their formal
language. Uses of inherent power and the creation of procedural
common law are even less worrisome because they fall outside the
domain of the written rules altogether. Thus, local rules emerge as
the primary - and perhaps the only - deviation from the transterritorial ideal, and the argument for their elimination appears
straightforward and compelling: remove local rules, and the
promise of trans-territoriality is fulfilled.
Unfortunately, this thin conception of trans-territoriality is
inconsistent with the ends that the pursuit of trans-territorial
procedure are intended to serve.160 Most obviously, a focus on the
language of written rules serves only a very formalistic notion of
equality. To further a more robust interest in equality, what is
required is enough procedural consistency to ensure that similar
cases are treated equally.161 Superficial uniformity is therefore
insufficient, and the proper emphasis should instead be on the
actual procedural requirements that are imposed. Given that
emphasis, any source of territorial variation raises concerns.
Formal uniformity also fails to meaningfully promote the
nationalization of legal practice. A fixed set of rules means that
lawyers need only memorize one set of words and numbers, but it
does not put them in a position to enter a federal courtroom in an
unfamiliar district without having ―to rely heavily on the wisdom
of local practitioners.‖162 Again, a practicing lawyer is ultimately
concerned with the actual procedural requirements that may be
imposed, which requires more than a mere understanding of what
the written rules say. In short, the value of trans-territoriality
suggests something more than a formal uniformity of written
159

And given the formalistic nature of this conception of trans-territoriality,
even standing orders might be distinguished from local rules on the grounds that
only the latter are denoted as ―rules.‖
160
See supra Part I.B.
161
See supra note __.
162
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1474.
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rules. And given a more robust conception, local rules look much
less like an outlier. To the contrary, each of the forms of variation
discussed in Part III represent deviations from the trans-territorial
ideal.163
Of course, it should also be clear that trans-territoriality in
this robust sense will always be aspirational rather than actual. It
is not practical to create a procedural regime that imposes
procedural requirements that are not sensitive to the location of the
suit. Rather, the creation of a set of procedural rules that apply
across the federal system will inevitably involve territorial
variation in one form or another. Local rules should therefore be
viewed as one potential component of an inevitable mix of
territorial variation. So situated, the question of whether they
should be retained - and in what role - becomes more complex. It
is not enough simply to ask whether they disrupt territorial
uniformity, for at some level of course they do. Instead, the
appropriate question is whether a procedural regime that permits
local rules produces a better mix of territorial variation than one
that does not.
Reframing the question in this way does not necessarily
entail a different conclusion. Even if trans-territoriality cannot be
fully achieved, it still might support an effort to root out deviations
wherever possible.
Some competing forms - such as
164
interpretation and the exercise of inherent power165 - may be
163

To be sure, some of the forms discussed in Part III are not ―territorial‖ in
precisely the same way as local rules. Local rules create procedural differences
that apply throughout a federal judicial district; thus, the relevant territory is
defined along district lines. The territorial divisions associated with competing
forms are occasionally broader. For example, when an appellate court has
interpreted a rule in a particular way, the relevant territory is demarcated by
circuit lines. More often, the divisions are narrower. When an individual judge
chooses how to exercise procedural discretion, or whether to supplement the
formal rules with a procedural requirement justified by inherent power, the
relevant territory is limited to the individual courtroom. Despite these
distinctions in the physical scope of the variation, each of the forms discussed
contribute to differences in procedural requirements that are attributable to the
location of the suit, and each therefore undermines the goal of uniformity
embodied by the value of trans-territoriality.
164
Even Professor Struve concedes that some judicial interpretation will
necessarily accompany the introduction and application of a set of procedural
rules. See Struve, supra note 118, at 1102.
165
Commentators and courts have long suggested that the legislative power to
limit inherent power is limited, although uncertainty remains about the precise
scope of the limitation. See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power,
supra note 158, at 1688.
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impossible to eliminate, but local rules may remain an attractive
target that would reduce the total amount of territorial variation in
the procedural system. What this misses is that the forms of
territorial variation are interrelated and transposable, at least to
some extent. That is, the introduction of a local rule can often
serve to displace a competing form of territorial variation. Many
local rules define requirements that might otherwise be imposed
through a standing order or an exercise of inherent power, while
others channel the exercise of judicial discretion or fix meaning
that might otherwise be selected through interpretation. In short,
local rules do not exist in a vacuum, and their presence or absence
will have ancillary effects on the overall level and composition of
territorial variation in the procedural system.166
A proper
understanding of their desirability and function thus requires a
consideration of the way that they interact with - and compare to competing forms of territorial variation. The next section engages
in such a comparison, and concludes that local rules have some
significant advantages that should lead to acceptance of, and
perhaps even enthusiasm for, their role in the procedural
framework.
B.

A Comparative Assessment of Local Rules

When compared with competing forms of territorial
variation, local rules emerge as desirable along several dimensions.
They are transparent, which - contrary to common understanding means that they facilitate national practice.
They involve
significant levels of participation and input from judges, but also
from non-judicial actors. And they apply uniformly throughout a
judicial district and across time, which promotes a desirable form
of equal treatment among cases.
1. Transparency and Nationalization

166

Although local rules can substitute for other forms of territorial variation,
they will not always do so. Therefore, the availability of local rules as a form of
territorial variation may generate some overall increase in the level of
disuniformity within the federal system. But that does not necessarily mean that
we should seek to eliminate local rules. Ultimately, we should be concerned not
just about the amount of territorial disuniformity, but also about its quality.
Consideration of the overall mix of territorial variation in a system that permits
local rules may lead us to tolerate the former to enhance the latter.
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Local rules are transparent in the sense that they are visible
and easily discoverable. This is not altogether surprising, given
that many of the recent amendments to Rule 83 have been
explicitly designed to facilitate those qualities. For example, the
current version of Rule 83(a)(1) requires district courts to
―conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States.‖167 Thus, local rules now
track the numbering of the federal rules, which makes it easy for
lawyers familiar with the latter to locate counterparts in the former.
This task is made even simpler by the fact that local rules are now
posted on court websites, often in a searchable format. 168 As a
result, a lawyer interested in discovering local rules relating to
summary judgment in a particular district can do so either by
looking at Local Rule 56 or by performing a basic search of the
local rules.
Local rules are also transparent in the sense that
they are defined in advance. They are promulgated according to a
set process,169 become enforceable on a set date, and are generally
not applied retroactively.170 This means that they, like the federal
rules themselves, represent a set of procedural requirements that
167

FED. R. CIV. P. 83. Prior to this requirement, district courts used a variety of
competing numbering systems for local rules, which made it difficult to find and
compare local rules. See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT ON LOCAL RULES 17
(Feb.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Final_Local_Rules_Report_March_%202004.pdf.
168
In some districts, the court website includes a search function. See, e.g.,
Northern
District
of
Illinois,
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/
LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule. In other districts, there is no search function,
but the rules are available as a downloadable document that can be searched.
See, e.g., District of Montana, http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/rules.htm
(providing a downloadable .pdf of the court‘s rules).
169
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
170
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (―A local rule takes effect on the date specified by
the district court and remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated
by the judicial council of the circuit.‖). See also Wash. Mobilization Comm. v.
Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 190 n.2 (D.D.C. 1975) (finding that a local rule
relating to requirements for class certification promulgated after the filing of the
complaint would not apply retroactively to class certification determination)
rev'd in part on other grounds by 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Boring v.
Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 80 (M.D.Pa. 1974) (―Our local
rules . . . have no retroactive effect.‖); In re: Estate of Marstellar, No. 03 MA
185, 2004 WL 2659253 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the probate
court could not retroactively apply a newly promulgated local rule reducing the
amount of litigation fees and attorney expenses awarded) (citing In re: Estate of
Covington, No. 03 MA 98, 2004 WL 1534126 at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)).
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are not only discoverable, but discoverable prior to any interaction
with the court.171
Most competing forms of territorial variation are relatively
less transparent. Standing orders basically track local rules in the
sense that they are available on court websites and are pre-defined,
but they need not conform to any particular organizational
structure, which at the margins makes them more difficult to
navigate.172 If the governing appellate court has interpreted a
particular rule provision, then that interpretation is like a local rule
in the sense that it is discoverable and knowable in advance,
although the method of discovery takes a different form. In the
event that there is no binding interpretation by the appellate court,
the diligent lawyer‘s next move would be to research
interpretations at the district court level, either by the presiding
judge or her colleagues. But these earlier interpretations are
merely predictive,173 and for that reason they are not discoverable
in the same way that local rules and binding interpretations are.
Moreover, the task of compiling and reconciling competing
interpretations by multiple district judges is not nearly as
171

Of course, there are downsides to pre-definition. Relative to some other
forms of territorial variation such as discretion and inherent authority, local rules
are more inflexible precisely because they involve pre-definition of procedural
requirements rather than the development of requirements within the context of
specific cases. So to the extent we prefer specific and contextual requirements,
we may prefer to eschew local rules in favor of those other forms. Indeed, the
choice to embed a discretionary standard within a generally applicable federal
rule may reflect a conclusion that contextual judgment is needed. This suggests
that we should not expect local rules to be capable of displacing other forms that
permit contextual decision-making. But short of total displacement, there is still
room for local rules to eliminate or narrow discretion in some instances, such as
when the selection of a discretionary standard reflects a failure to reach a
national consensus on a more fixed rule.
172
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) specifies that standing orders may not be enforced
absent ―actual notice‖ in advance to the alleged violator. This requirement
might be strictly enforced to ensure that non-uniform numbering or organization
will not disadvantage lawyers and parties, but in practice the internet publication
of a judge‘s standing orders in toto has been viewed to satisfy the requirement of
actual notice. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
173
This is true even of prior interpretations by the same district judge. A district
judge who has interpreted a rule in a particular way in a previous case may be
likely to adopt the same interpretation again, but that result is not compelled
because traditional stare decisis principles do not apply to district judges. Amy
Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015,
1070 (2003); see also Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d 453,
457-58 (7th Cir. 2005); Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 928
F.2d 1366, 1371 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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straightforward as the identification of a governing local rule.
Areas governed by procedural common law function similarly to
interpretation; in the absence of a binding appellate decision,
lawyers will rely on uncertain predictions based on prior decisions
at the district court level.
Areas governed by discretion and inherent authority are
less transparent still. Although the discretionary standard may be
knowable in advance, the way that any given judge will choose to
implement that discretion is much more difficult to ascertain.
Again, prior opinions may help, but their predictive value is
arguably weaker because of the context-specific nature of
discretionary decisions. A larger problem is that most exercises of
discretion will not find their way into a published opinion at all,
and so the informational cue provided by prior cases will be
incomplete.174 Instead, the best predictive source with respect to
discretion-based procedural requirements is prior experience with
the judge. Lawyers seeking to know how the broad authority
provided under Rule 16 will be exercised are likely to ask other
lawyers who have experience practicing before the judge. As for
inherent authority, it is used less frequently (and perhaps less
predictably or consistently) and so the available predictive
information is even more limited. Thus, while it is true that
procedural requirements are transparent in the sense that they
cannot generally be enforced without first being made explicit, it is
also true that lawyers and parties will be hard pressed to know
what those requirements might be at the outset of the case.
All of this turns one of the traditional arguments against
local rules on its head. Critics of local rules have long argued that
local rules discourage the nationalization of legal practice, and are
therefore in tension with one of the original goals of transterritorial procedure.175 The basis for that complaint is that nonlocal counsel are burdened by the need to discover and master
local rules. But regardless of whether local rules are permitted, a
lawyer must familiarize herself with the local legal culture to
practice effectively in a new geographic district (or even in front of
a new judge within the same district). In practice, local rules may
174

This point applies in the intepretive context, too. Not all interpretations will
be reduced to a formal opinion, although perhaps actions based on interpretation
are relatively more likely to trigger a written explanation than those based on
discretion.
175
For a discussion of the nationalizing goal of trans-territoriality, see supra Part
I.B.1.
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serve to level the playing field by formalizing that local legal
culture and presenting it in a visible way. Put differently, if local
rulemaking authority is removed, territorial variation will not
disappear, but will become embedded in less visible forms, and the
disadvantage presented to the outsider will be exacerbated rather
than relieved.
2. Participation and Quality
Local rules also involve input from non-judicial actors.
Again, this is the result of intentional changes to the local
rulemaking process that have been designed to enhance
participation rights. To begin, the current version of Rule 83
requires a period for notice and comment before local rules are
promulgated, which gives an avenue for participation to anyone
who might be affected by a proposed rule change.176 Moreover,
many recent developments in local rules have their roots in the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which requires the creation of an
advisory committee which consists of a mix of judges and others
―who must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.‖177
Taken together, these process reforms mean that local rules now
reflect the input of non-judicial actors both at the stage of initial
drafting, and at the stage of post-drafting consideration.
Admittedly, these participation rights remain weak. Nonjudicial actors have no final role in the rulemaking process; the
ultimate decision about whether adopt a local rule remains firmly
in the hands of the district judges themselves.178 In other words,
non-judicial actors are granted a voice in the process, but denied a
vote. Moreover, the rights that exist are imperfect. Although
anyone may participate in the notice and comment process, in
practice the voices raised are likely to be local. Consequently, the
176

FED. R. CIV. P. 83. This requirement is of fairly new vintage, and was
introduced to address concerns about the insulated nature of the local
rulemaking process. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
177
S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 414 (statement of Sen. Biden).
178
And another potential form of participation in the process - appellate
challenge of the rules actually adopted - has been generally resisted by the
appellate courts. See Flanders, supra note 10, at 217-18 (describing the failure of
appellate courts to monitor and enforce statutory limitations on the proper scope
of local rules). Even if appellate courts were more aggressive, however, they
would be authorized to act only when an adopted rule is inconsistent with the
rulemaking authority provided by Rule 83. In other words, the appellate courts
could not impose a competing local rule on the basis of preference alone.
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input generated may be skewed, and the resulting rules may favor
local interests.179
But even if limited and imperfect, these participation rights
distinguish local rules from competing forms of territorial
variation. Standing orders, for example, involve no formal
participation rights other than the standard right to appeal. 180 As
for the remaining forms of territorial variation, the ability of nonjudicial actors to participate is generally limited to participation in
the litigation process itself. That is, a lawyer involved in a
particular case may have an opportunity to argue on behalf of his
preferred interpretation, or on behalf of her preferred exercise of
discretion, and that argument may contribute to the development of
the procedural rules imposed in the case.181 But this case-specific
participation is different in kind from the ability to contribute to
the development of generally applicable rules that the local
rulemaking process provides, especially since the number of
participants in that latter process is potentially much greater and
more diverse.
3. Scope and Equality
The scope of local rules differs from the scope of
competing forms of territorial variation in two respects. First, the
territorial scope of local rules is not the same as competing forms.
Local rules apply throughout a federal district. Standing orders, as
well as exercises of discretion and inherent power, operate more
narrowly at the level of the individual district judge. Rule
interpretations may operate at that level, too, although they can
also be broader, as when the Supreme Court or the appellate court
has issued an interpretation. The territorial scope of procedural
common law may also range from the district level to the national
level, depending on the status of doctrinal development. Second,
the temporal scope of local rules is not the same as competing
forms. Once promulgated, local rules apply prospectively to all
cases, at least until amended. They share this stability with
179

See supra text accompanying notes 80. But of course, the presence of local
input, even if disproportionate to non-local input, does not guarantee that the
resulting rules will be skewed.
180
See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 (describing the process for
promulgating standing orders).
181
And even this form of participation is not guaranteed. A court need not ask
for input from lawyers before interpreting a rule or exercising rule-based
discretion.
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standing orders, appellate interpretations, and some procedural
common law. But other competing forms are less stable.
Interpretations made by district judges are governed by law of the
case principles, but do not have any precedential value that extends
beyond the judgment. Exercises of discretion and inherent power
are similar; a district judge may exercise discretion to impose a
procedural requirement in one case, and then decline to impose
that requirement in the next case, even if the two cases are similar.
These differences in scope have effects in terms of how
similar cases are treated. The notions of equality embedded in the
design of our procedural system demand that similar cases reach
similar outcomes, and this demand for equality is sensitive to both
territory and time. Because they apply to every case throughout a
federal district, local rules have the salutary effect of making the
procedural requirements imposed by judges within that district
more consistent. And because they are stable unless formally
amended through an established process, they also make those
requirements more consistent over time. In some circumstances, a
different form of territorial variation may better promote equality,
but local rules offer a mix of territorial and temporal consistency
that is relatively attractive.
Of course, local rules do not serve the equality interest
perfectly. Variations in procedural requirements will undoubtedly
remain even in a regime that permits local rules, and variations in
the treatment of similar cases may therefore result. But because
these variations track district lines, they may be more acceptable
than other variations which appear much more random. Put
differently, differences in outcomes based on the district where the
case is filed may be less damaging to our intuitions of fairness than
differences in outcomes based on the judge within a district to
whom a case is assigned.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the traditional complaint about local rules is
that they create geographic variations in the federal system, and
that those variations undermine the procedural value of transterritoriality. Procedural uniformity is good; local rules disrupt
uniformity; therefore, local rules must go. This argument is
facially attractive, but ultimately unconvincing. It views local
rules as an outlier, as an obstacle to the fulfillment of an ideal. But
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in practice, territorial variations in procedural requirements are
common and inevitable, and the sources of those variations are
numerous and transposable. If we broaden the lens on territorial
variation, the debate about local rules looks much different. The
choice is not between two procedural systems, one with territorial
variation and one without. It is between two profiles of territorial
variation, one that includes local rules and one that does not.
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